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Non-technical summary
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations
can be explained by preferences for equity. The last two decades have shown an in-
creasing number of negotiations and protocols on subjects of environmental concern
such as global warming. Since the impact of a single country on the global pollution
level is rather small, each country has an incentive to free-ride on (possible) emission
reductions made by the rest of the world. Therefore, the incentive structure of such
an emission game is similar to a prisoner’s dilemma. The question is how the coopera-
tion that is observed in prisoner’s dilemma situations as well as in some international
agreements on the abatement of global pollutants can be explained.
In this paper, we rely on a preference structure in which countries are not solely inter-
ested in their absolute payoff but also in equity. We first show that within a symmetric
N-country prisoner’s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addi-
tion to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, partial or even full cooperation can
also result as a Nash equilibrium. If not all countries defect, then the fraction of co-
operating countries is rather large. Equity preferences, however, cannot improve upon
the standard inefficient Nash-equilibrium in an emission game where countries have a
continuous choice of the abatement level: Countries behave as if they would unilaterally
maximise their payoff. The last part of this paper is dedicated to the study of a two
stage game on coalition formation. Here, the presence of equity-interested countries
increases the coalition size and the total abatement effort. A stable international en-
vironmental agreement with full cooperation, i.e. an efficient outcome, can be reached
if all countries’ interests in equity are strong enough.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that international cooperation is needed in order to deal effectively
with environmental problems, such as global warming and the depletion of the ozone
layer. Since pollution crosses borders and causes negative effects on a global scale, any
country that reduces emissions supplies a public good, e.g. the reduction of climate
change.
The impact of a single country on the global pollution level, however, is rather small.
Hence, when reducing emissions, a country must bear abatement costs but benefits
only little, i.e. the incentives for a country to reduce emissions are small. Rather, the
country has an incentive to free-ride on (possible) emission reductions made by the
rest of the world. Consequently, although it pays if all parties cooperate, each agent
unilaterally has an incentive to defect from cooperation. Thus, the incentive structure
can be described as a prisoner’s dilemma, clearly leading to an undesired outcome. This
incentive problem is rather severe, because — contrary to locally bounded pollution —
there is no supranational authority that can enforce cooperative behavior.
However, the last two decades have shown an increasing number of negotiations and
protocols on subjects of (global) environmental concern. Perhaps most prominent are
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer, the Basel Conven-
tion on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste, and the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which established a process leading to
the 1998 Kyoto Protocol which specifies targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases.
However, it is not absolutely clear whether these agreements go substantially beyond
actions that countries would have done in their self-interest anyway. For example, Mur-
doch and Sandler (1997) argue that the Montreal protocol does not prove cooperative
behaviour. The Kyoto protocol has not yet been ratified by most countries, although
it specifies substantial emission reduction targets. Rather, there are attempts by some
(but not all) countries to water down (renegotiate) the whole agreement. This became
evident when countries tried to obtain the management of sinks for CO2 accredited as
an abatement effort at COP6 in The Hague in November 2000. Clearly, whatever the
result of the ongoing negotiations will be, any adopted policy must be in the interest
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of each party involved.
In attempting to explain cooperation and coalition formation, most theoretical models
use a two-period structure as introduced by Barrett (1992, 1994). Here, countries must
first decide whether or not to join a coalition. In a second step, both the coalition and
the remaining countries choose their emission levels non-cooperatively. A coalition is
stable if no country wants to join the coalition and no country has an incentive to
leave. Simulations by Barrett (1992, 1994, 1997), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and
Hoel (1992) have shown that — although there is cooperation — the coalition size is
rather small. Most recently, Borek and Rutz (2000) have demonstrated that this result
is directly caused by the fundamental incentive structure of this game: If one allows
for a continuous number of small countries within the coalition, all positive effects of
coalition vanish and the non-cooperative outcome emerges.
The question remains how the cooperation that is observed in prisoner’s dilemma situ-
ations as well as in some international agreements can be explained. In this paper, we
rely on a preference structure given by the ERC-theory (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000,
2001).1 This theory explains most of the behaviour of agents observed in diverse exper-
iments2 but deviates little from the traditional utility concept. The utility of an agent
is not solely based on the absolute payoff but also on the relative payoff compared
to the overall payoff to all agents. Given a certain relative payoff share, the utility
is strictly increasing in the own absolute payoff of the agent. Given a fixed absolute
payoff, the agent is best off when receiving just the equal (fair) share. To both sides of
this equal share, i.e. when receiving less or more than the fair amount, utility is lower,
even if the absolute payoff does not change.3
Although this behaviour was found on an individual basis, it can also be motivated for
countries (governments). Essentially, any government must consider the preferences of
its voters. A decision not to reduce emissions can probably be “sold” to these voters
1ERC hereby stands for Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition.
2As already noted by Bolton and Ockenfels, this theory can generate cooperation in the standard
prisoner’s dilemma.
3Note that such a preference for equity is self-centred only and is distinct from altruism (Bolton
and Ockenfels 2001). A country’s utility is determined solely by its own absolute and relative payoff.
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more easily the more other countries also refuse to cooperate. If, however, the rest of
the world is within a coalition and substantially reduces emissions, it might be hard
for a government to explain free-riding, even though this certainly maximises the “pay-
off”. Whereas this argument (qualitatively) requires similar proportional abatement
levels, another equity argument is based on the per capita emission level. Specifically
developing countries claim that developed countries with high per capita emission lev-
els of greenhouse gases are responsible for global warming; for example the leader of
the Indian delegation at the negotiations on the Rio Convention 1991 demanded that,
within the negotiations, “the principle of equity should be the touchstone for judging
any proposal” (Dagupta 1994: 133).
In this paper, we apply the ERC-theory to the problem of international cooperation
in reduction of some global pollutant like the greenhouse gas CO2. We concentrate on
the case of countries, which are identical with respect to both their abatement costs
and their benefits from abatement. We first study a symmetric N-country prisoner’s
dilemma game in which the agents have only two options available — cooperate or defect.
We analyse Nash-equilibria when agents’ preferences can be described by ERC, i.e.
players value both their absolute and their relative payoff. In particular, we look at the
number of countries who play cooperatively. We show that non-cooperation is always
an equilibrium, since — if no other country cooperates — a country would maximise
its absolute payoff and receive the equal share by choosing to defect. Additionally,
however, there may be Nash-equilibria in which countries cooperate: If, for example,
the rest of the world plays cooperatively, a country can get the equal share by choosing
to cooperate as well. Hence, if it values its relative payoff being close to the equal share
more than its absolute payoff, it will choose to complete the grand coalition. Clearly,
partial cooperation can also occur; some countries cooperate while others defect. For
such equilibria, we show that the number of cooperating countries is rather large: Since
cooperation leads to a lower absolute payoff, for a country to choose to cooperate,
playing cooperatively must move it closer to the equal share than defecting would. As
we show, this can only be the case if at least half of the countries cooperate. This
result contrasts with the standard result by Barrett and others that the coalition size
is rather small.
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Note, however, that in the prisoner’s dilemma, the countries have only the discrete
choice of cooperating or defecting, but with respect to the global warming problem,
countries can choose their emission level continuously. We therefore analyse a sym-
metric emission game. Here, ERC alone cannot improve upon the non-cooperative
Nash-equilibrium with standard preferences in which only the absolute payoff matters
to a country. The reason is that as long as a country receives less than the equal share
and has the possibility to increase its absolute payoff, it will do so. Since this holds for
all countries, none agree to get less than the fair share. The unique Nash equilibrium
therefore is identical to the symmetric Nash-equilibrium with standard preferences.
This result changes, however, if a stage of coalition formation is introduced. To illus-
trate this, we study a standard two stage coalition formation game with ERC pref-
erences. Here, in contrast to the traditional models by Barrett (1994), Carraro and
Siniscalco (1993), etc., coalitions that involve a rather large fraction of countries can
be stabilised. If each country puts enough weight into getting close to the equal payoff
share, even the grand coalition can be obtained in equilibrium. In general, the pres-
ence of (some) equity-interested countries increases the incentive to join a coalition
and, therefore, leads to a larger coalition size in equilibrium. The efficiency gains are
maximal if countries that are interested in equity stay outside the coalition and reward
a higher abatement effort of the coalition with an expansion of their own abatement
level.
The paper is organised in the following way: In section 2, the basic features of the ERC
theory are introduced. We then study the discrete version of a symmetric N-country
prisoner’s dilemma in section 3, whereas the emission game is analysed in section 4.
Here, we look at the Nash-equilibria of the one shot game first and then study stable
coalitions in the two-stage coalition formation game. The final section — as always —
concludes.
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2 The preference structure
The analysis in this paper relies on a preference structure in which players do not
solely draw utility from their absolute payoff. Rather, along with their own payoff,
they are motivated (non-monotonously) by the relative payoff share they receive, i.e.
how their standing compares to that of others. With this, we rely on the ERC-model by
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) but use a full information framework. This theory explains
the behaviour of people observed in a rather large group of experiments better than
the standard theory. As already mentioned, it can also be rationalised for countries
(governments) whose citizens have some preference for fair sharing abatement efforts
among countries.
Let the (non-negative) payoff to agent i be denoted by yi, i, . . . ,N , the relative share
by σi = yi/(
P
j yj). The utility function is given by:
aiu(yi) + bir(σi)
where ai, bi ≥ 0, u(·) is strictly increasing and concave, and r(·) is concave and has
its maximum at σi = 1/N . Throughout this paper we assume that r(·) is symmetric
around 1/N , i.e. r(1/N − x) = r(1/N + x) for all x > 0. The types of countries are
characterised by the relative weights ai/bi.
3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
As already noted, many problems of providing public goods have the basic incentive
structure of a prisoner’s dilemma. Although every agent (country) prefers the provision
of this good, she (it) has an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of the other players
and, hence, the public good will not be provided, or at least not in an efficient amount.
This, in particular, holds true for any problem of transboundary pollution, e.g. the
problem of climate change caused by CO2 emissions, where reducing emissions can be
interpreted as providing such a public good.
In this section we study a simple symmetric N -country prisoner’s dilemma (PD game)
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where each country has two actions available. It can cooperate, “c”, or defect, “d”.
In terms of the climate change problem: The country either reduces emissions by a
(pre-) specified amount or it doesn’t. This situation may occur when countries have to
decide whether or not to ratify an international agreement which already specifies the
emission levels that must be abated.
3.1 The payoff structure
The total number of cooperating countries is denoted by k. For any given k, the payoff
to a country is given by B(k) if the country defects (tries to free-ride). If a country
plays cooperatively, it must bear some additional costs C(k). Its payoff is therefore
given by B(k) − C(k). We assume decreasing marginal benefits for a country if the
number of contributers rises, i.e. B(·) is increasing and concave. Further, the total
cost of cooperation, kC(k), increases in k.
In order to generate the standard incentive structure of a PD game, we assume that
B(k + 1) − B(k) < C(k + 1), i.e. playing cooperatively reduces the absolute payoff,
given an arbitrary number of “c”-countries. To make more cooperation attractive from
both the social and the individual point of view, we make the following assumption:
(i) NB(k + 1)− (k + 1)C(k + 1) ≥ NB(k)− kC(k). “socially desirable”
(ii) B(k + 1)− C(k + 1) ≥ B(k)− C(k). “individually desirable”
Further, we assume that payoffs for both cooperating and defecting countries are non-
negative for all k.
3.2 The Nash equilibria
In the following, we analyse Nash equilibria in the one shot PD game where countries
choose simultaneously. Assume that k countries, aside from country i, play coopera-
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tively. Then country i chooses to play “c” if and only if:
aiu(B(k + 1)− C(k + 1)) + bir
µ
B(k + 1)− C(k + 1)
NB(k + 1)− (k + 1)C(k + 1)
¶
≥ aiu(B(k)) + bir
µ
B(k)
NB(k)− kC(k)
¶
.
This is equivalent to country i playing “c” if
ai/bi ≤ δ(k) :=
r
³
B(k+1)−C(k+1)
NB(k+1)−(k+1)C(k+1)
´
− r
³
B(k)
NB(k)−kC(k)
´
u(B(k))− u(B(k + 1)− C(k + 1)) . (1)
In other words, in order to choose “c” the country must be overcompensated for the
loss in absolute payment by moving closer to the average payment.
Note that in (1) the denominator of δ(k) is positive, since playing “d” always maximises
the absolute payoff. The sign of the numerator, however, depends on the number k
of cooperating countries. For k = 0, playing “d” gives the equal share and, hence,
maximises the motivation by relative payoff. Thus, δ(0) is negative and no country
will unilaterally play cooperatively, since ai/bi is non-negative. For k = N−1, however,
the numerator is positive, because playing cooperatively and, hence, completing the
grand coalition gives the equal payoff share here. Thus, what matters for the choice
of action is the type of the country. If it values the absolute payoff relatively high, i.e.
ai/bi being relatively large, it plays “d”. If, however, the relative payoff is given more
weight (ai/bi ≤ δ(N − 1)), it chooses to play “c”. Thus, all countries playing “c” can
establish an equilibrium, provided that all countries’ types are smaller than δ(N − 1).
Hence, we can obtain cooperative behaviour for certain types of countries. In general,
there may also be equilibria where only a certain fraction of countries plays coopera-
tively. The general conditions for a Nash equilibrium of this ERC-PD game are given
by
ai/bi ≤ δ(k∗ − 1) for k∗ countries (playing “c”), (2)
ai/bi ≥ δ(k∗) for the remaining N − k∗ countries (playing “d”). (3)
Since δ(0) < 0 and δ(N − 1) > 0, we immediately obtain the following result:
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Proposition 1 (Nash equilibria) All countries playing “d” is always a Nash equi-
librium. Additionally — depending on the types of the countries — there may be equilibria
in which some or all countries play “c”.
Two extreme cases may serve to illustrate the proposition: If all agents value only the
absolute payoff (bi = 0), in other words, if we are back to standard preferences, it merely
results the non-cooperative equilibrium. If, however, agents are solely motivated by
their relative payoff share, ai = 0, we have two equilibria — one in which all countries
play “d”, the other where all countries cooperate. Thus, if we look at the question of
whether or not to ratify an already negotiated international agreement, we see that no
country would like to be the first if it expects the others not to ratify. If, however, all
except of one country have already ratified, then this country may decide to ratify as
well.
In the following, we have a closer look at the number of countries that may possibly
cooperate in a Nash equilibrium. On the one hand, as long as δ(k∗ − 1) < 0, there is
no chance of having a coalition of size k∗. Here, ai/bi > δ(k∗ − 1) for all types and
condition (2) cannot hold for any country. On the other hand, the conditions for a
Nash equilibrium given by (2) and (3) immediately imply that if δ(k∗ − 1) > 0 then
there are types ((ai/bi)i=1,...,N) of countries such that k∗ countries cooperate and N−k∗
countries free-ride. These types — for example — could be given by ai/bi = δ(k∗− 1) for
i = 1, ...k∗, and ai/bi = min{δ(k∗ − 1), δ(k∗)} for i = k∗ + 1, ...,N .
In order to find feasible coalition sizes, we must therefore study conditions in which
δ(·) is positive. Note again that the denominator of (1) is positive. The crucial point is
therefore whether or not the numerator is positive. Remember that we assumed that
the motivation drawn from the relative payoff, r(·), is symmetric around (its maximum
in) 1/N . Therefore, we have δ(k) > 0 if and only if, by choosing “d”, a country further
deviates from the equal share (1/N) than by playing “c”, i.e.
B(k)
NB(k)− kC(k) −
1
N
>
1
N
− B(k + 1)− C(k + 1)
NB(k + 1)− (k + 1)C(k + 1) .
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Straightforward calculus shows that this is equivalent to
0 < B(k + 1)C(k)Nk +B(k)C(k + 1)N [k + 1−N ] + C(k)C(k + 1)[Nk − 2k(k + 1)]
or
0 < B(k + 1)C(k)
N
k + 1
+B(k)C(k + 1)N
k + 1−N
k(k + 1)
+ C(k)C(k + 1)
·
N
k + 1
− 2
¸
=
·
B(k + 1)C(k)
N
k + 1
−B(k)C(k + 1)N
k
¸
+
·
NB(k)
k
− C(k)
¸
C(k + 1)
·
2− N
k + 1
¸
. (4)
We can use this inequality to study the number k∗ of agents that play cooperatively
in equilibrium. First, note that we assumed payoffs to be non-negative and therefore
NB(k) − kC(k) > 0. Thus, the second summand is negative for k < N/2 − 1. For
payoff functions that satisfy the requirement that total costs proportionally increase
more than the total benefits, i.e.
(k + 1)C(k + 1)
kC(k)
>
NB(k + 1)
NB(k)
, (5)
the first bracket in (4) is negative as well. As a consequence, inequality (4) cannot
hold and δ(k) < 0 for k < N/2 − 1. Thus, for any given vector of types, if a country
plays “c” in equiibrium, then, in total, at least half of the countries cooperate. For PD
games where inequality (5) does not hold, we obtain δ(N/2− 1) > 0, suggesting that
the minimal coalition size can be smaller than N/2. As long as the number of countries
exceeds 8, however, this is not the case:
Proposition 2 (minimal coalition size) For any given payoff structure of the PD
game, there is a lower bound of the coalition size that cannot be undercut: If any
country plays cooperatively, then — at least — N/2 countries cooperate if N ≥ 8 or total
costs of cooperation proportionally increase more than the benefits, i.e. inequality (5)
holds.
This proposition shows that if there is a coalition of cooperating countries, then it
is rather large. The intuition is that in order to make cooperation attractive for a
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country, it has to be closer to the equal payoff share than when playing “d”. This can
only the case if the number of countries that receive the (smaller) cooperative payoff
is already large. This result contrasts with the standard results from a coalition game
á la Barrett (1994), in which the coalition size is small.4
In order to prove the proposition, we derive an upper bound for δ(k) which is negative
for k ≤ N/2− 2. Therefore, δ(k∗− 1) > 0 can only be the case if k∗ ≥ N/2. The proof
is given in the appendix.5
The following example illustrates proposition 2.
Example 1 Let B(k) = km, C(k) = c, where c > m. Then, using inequality (4),
δ(k − 1) > 0 if and only if [Nm − c]c[2 − N/k] > 0. The minimal coalition size in
case of cooperation, therefore, equals N/2. It arises as an equilibrium, when exactly
N/2 countries have type a/b = 0, and the others value the absolute payment positively
(a/b > δ(N/2)). Figure 1 illustrates the function δ(k) for the special case in which
r(σ) = −(σ − 1/N)2/2, u(y) = y, m = 1, c = 1.5, and N = 10. Here, δ(N − 1) =
3.1 · 10−4. Therefore, if countries weight the utility from the relative payoff share by
more than 3225 times the absolute payoff (3225ai < bi), the grand coalition would result
as an equilibrium.
Note that proposition 2 is based on the assumption that the valuation of relative payoff
is symmetric around the equal share. If, however, agents value a downward deviation
less than an upward bias from the equal share, i.e. r(1/N −x) < r(1/N +x) for x > 0,
the minimal coalition size is even larger, and N/2 is still a lower bound. If the valuation
is skewed to the left, then the minimal coalition size shrinks.
4Note, however, that in the coalition model by Barrett, cooperation was generated by a two stage
structure of the game: Countries first decide whether or not to join a coalition and then, in a second
step, choose the emission level. We study the equilibria based on ERC preferences in such a game in
section 4.2.
5Note that although the derived upper bound is negative only for N ≥ 8, we have not been able
to construct examples for a smaller number of agents where the proposition does not hold.
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Figure 1: In order to obtain k∗ as the equilibrium number of cooperating countries, the
ERC-type ai/bi must be below the line at k = k∗ − 1 for k∗ and above the line at
k = k∗ for the remaining N − k∗ countries.
4 The emission game
In the previous section, we assumed that countries have only the discrete choice whether
or not to cooperate. Now, we look at an emission game where countries can choose
their emission levels continuously. It will become obvious that, here, ERC alone cannot
improve upon the non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium with standard preferences where
only the absolute payoff matters. However, introducing more structure to the game,
i.e. if countries play a coalition game as in Barrett (1994), ERC may yield a rather
large coalition size or even support the grand coalition.
Let the number of countries again be denoted by N . Each country must choose its
abatement level qi (i = 1, . . . , N). Abatement induces some costs C(qi) that are as-
sumed to be increasing and convex in the abatement level (C 0(·) > 0, C 00(·) > 0).
Reducing emissions creates some benefits B(Q) in terms of abated damage from cli-
mate change, where Q =
P
i qi denotes the aggregate abatement level. Benefits from
abatement are increasing and concave. The payoff to a country is therefore determined
by B(Q)− C(qi).
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4.1 Nash equilibria in the one shot emission game
We again analyse Nash equilibria when countries act simultaneously. Taking qj (j 6= i)
as given, country i chooses qi to maximise:
aiu(yi) + bir(σi)
where yi = B(
P
j 6=i qj + qi) − C(qi) denotes the absolute, and σi = yi/
P
j yj denotes
the relative payoff to country i. By choosing qi, a country directly influences its own
abatement costs and the benefits from abatement. It thereby also has an impact on
the payoff to the rest of the world, which enters its own utility through the relative
payoff. The first order condition is therefore given by:
0 =
"
aiu
0(·) + bir0(·)
P
j 6=i yj
[
P
j yj ]
2
#
[B0(Q)− C 0(qi)]− bir0(·) yi
[
P
j yj]
2
(N − 1)B0(Q)(6)
= aiu
0(·)[B0(Q)− C 0(qi)] + bir0(·)
"P
j(yj − yi)
[
P
j yj ]
2
B0(Q)−
P
j 6=i yj
[
P
j yj ]
2
C 0(qi)
#
= aiu
0(·)[B0(Q)− C 0(qi)] + bir0(·)
"
1−NσiP
j yj
B0(Q)−
P
j 6=i σjP
j yj
C 0(qi)
#
. (7)
The reaction of country i to a given abatement policy for the rest of the world can
be calculated from this first order condition. Let us first study the two extreme cases,
ai = 0 and bi = 0, respectively. For bi = 0, i.e. an absolute payoff maximiser,
the first order condition reduces to B0(Q) − C 0(qi) = 0. For ai = 0, the country is
solely interested in getting the equal payoff share. Hence it would choose qi to satisfy
NC(qi) =
P
j C(qj). For ai, bi 6= 0, the chosen abatement level is between the levels
for those extreme cases.
In a Nash equilibrium, the first order condition must be satisfied for all countries
simultaneously. Since r0(1/N) = 0, it follows immediately that for all types ai/bi,
i = 1, . . . , N there is a symmetric equilibrium where all countries choose the same
abatement level, i.e. σi = 1/N for all i. Here, the resulting abatement level q∗ is
given by the first order condition B0(Nq∗) − C 0(q∗) = 0. It corresponds to the Nash
equilibrium when agents are only interested in their absolute payoff and therefore
resembles the Nash equilibrium in the PD game where all countries defect.
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This equilibrium is the only one assuming that for at least one country ai is greater
than 0. To see this, assume that there is an asymmetric equilibrium, i.e. some countries
receive less, others more than the equal share. In this case, on the one hand, σi < 1/N
implies that r0(σi) > 0, and hence from equation (6), we obtain B0(Q) − C 0(qi) > 0.
On the other hand, for σi > 1/N we have r0(σi) < 0, and therefore equation (7)
implies B0(Q) − C 0(qi) < 0. These two inequalities, however, would imply that a
country which takes more than the equal share has larger marginal abatement costs
than countries that receive less. This, however, implies that the abatement cost of
countries that get more than the equal share are larger, which clearly contradicts the
assumed payoff distribution. Hence, only symmetric equilibria exist. Here, if ai > 0
for at least one country, we get B0(Nq) − C 0(q) = 0 from equation (6). Only in the
extreme (unlikely) case that all countries are solely interested in equal payoff could any
arbitrary abatement level be implemented as a symmetric equilibrium.
We can summarise the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (emission game) In the emission game for ERC preferences, the
equilibrium is given by B0(Nq∗) = C 0(q∗). It is unique as long as at least one country
draws utility from its absolute payoff (ai > 0).
Introducing ERC preferences, therefore, does not increase the abatement effort chosen
by the countries. It does not even change the equilibrium emission levels. In contrast
to the (discrete) prisoner’s dilemma, ERC does not add any equilibria in which there
is more abatement effort (cooperation). The existence of equilibria in the PD game
that mimicks cooperative behaviour, therefore, only arises in the presence of discrete
action sets. Having a continuous decision variable, ERC does not change the set of
equilibria. Apparently, the reason is that ERC does not establish a preference for being
cooperative, but for being similar to other countries with respect to the payoff.
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4.2 Coalition formation in the emission game
Whereas in the last section we analysed the Nash equilibria in the one shot emission
game, we now study a two-stage game of international negotiations as developed by
Barrett (1994). Let us again assume that all countries are identical with respect to their
payoff function. In a first stage, countries decide whether or not to join the coalition.
Here, each country takes the decisions of the other countries as given. Each country
anticipates, however, that the abatement levels, which are chosen in the second stage,
depend on whether it does or does not enter the coalition. In stage 2, countries inside
and outside the coalition simultaneously select their abatement levels. The coalition
thereby maximises its collective benefits but plays Nash against the non-signatory
countries which simultaneously maximise their individual utility.6
We first study the case of countries that have identical ERC-types. We demonstrate
that within the coalition formation game, ERC-preferences can enforce cooperation
and even result in the grand coalition. In the second step, we then look at the case
of heterogenous ERC-types. By studying the extreme scenario of countries that are
solely interested either in their absolute payoff or in equity, we will explore the effects
of the existence of some equity-oriented countries.
4.2.1 Cooperation of identical ERC-types
We solve the coalition formation game backwards. That is, for any coalition size k,
we first study the first order conditions for the choice of the abatement level inside
and outside the coalition. Then, in the second step, the equilibrium coalition size
is determined by a stability condition. This means that in the equilibrium, k must
satisfy the condition that there is an incentive to neither leave nor join the coalition.
For standard preferences (here resulting as the special case in which b equals 0), the
traditional literature shows that the coalition size is rather small. For ERC preferences,
however, the number of countries within a coalition can be much higher in equilibrium.
6Note that, in contrast to Barrett (1994), we assume that the coalition does not behave as a
Stackelberg leader. Rather, it takes the abatement levels of the rest of the world as given, i.e. it plays
Nash.
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Instead of solving the game in general, we will show that if countries only value the
relative payoff high enough, i.e. a/b is below a certain bound, then even the grand
coalition can be stable.
For countries outside the coalition, the first order condition is again given by (6),
whereas the coalition S maximises the utility of a representative member by choosing
the abatement policy for all its members, i ∈ S. It is plain that all countries within the
coalition S must have the same abatement level, qS, since all countries are assumed to
be of the same type. Hence, the absolute (yS = B(Q)−C(qS)) and the relative payoffs
(σS = yS/(kyS +
P
j 6∈S yj)) are equal for all members of the coalition. This leads to
the following condition:
0 = [au0(·) + br0(·)]
P
j 6∈S σjP
j yj
[kB0(Q)− C 0(qS)]− br0(·) σ
SP
j yj
(N − k)kB0(Q) (8)
= au0(·)[kB0(Q)− C 0(qS)] + br0(·)
"
−
P
j 6∈S σjP
j yj
C 0(qS) + kB0(Q)
1−NσSP
j yj
#
. (9)
From the last section we already know that if σj < (>)1/N for j 6∈ S, then B0(Q) > (<
)C 0(qj). Analogously, for the coalition, we obtain from (8) and (9) that if σS < (>)1/N
then kB0(Q) > (<)C 0(qS). Since B0(Q) < kB0(Q), the first order conditions therefore
imply that for countries within a coalition σS < 1/N and, thus,
kB0(Q) ≥ C 0(qS).
This inequality can now be used to show the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (coalition game) In the symmetric coalition game for identical ERC
preferences (type a/b), the grand coalition is stable if a/b is sufficiently small, i.e.
countries are interested enough in being close to the equal share.
Note first, that within the grand coalition, the emission level satisfies the condition
NB0(Nq∗) = C 0(q∗), independently of the ERC-types. Here, countries clearly receive
the equal share. If country i leaves the coalition (k = N − 1), then from the first order
conditions we obtain:
(N − 1)B0((N − 1)qS + qi) ≥ C 0(qS) ≥ C 0(qi) ≥ B0((N − 1)qS + qi).
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Let us now look at the abatement levels that would result if the ERC-type a/b goes to
zero. In this case, countries get more and more interested in getting their equal share,
and their abatement levels will converge. Hence, in the limit q = qS = qi, but still
(N − 1)B0(Nq) ≥ C 0(q). Hence, in the limit the absolute payoff of a country leaving
the coalition is smaller than within the grand coalition, whereas the relative payoff is
the same. Therefore, as long as a/b is small enough, the absolute payoff remains lower,
and — due to the asymmetric payoff share — the utility derived from the relative payoff
is also smaller than in the grand coalition. Thus, no country has an incentive to leave
the grand coalition if a/b is small enough.
4.2.2 Coalition of heterogenous ERC-types
Apparently, if one allows for heterogenous ERC-types, starting in the grand coalition,
countries that have the largest ai/bi will have the greatest interest to leave the coalition
in order to obtain a larger absolute payoff. In the following we concentrate on the
extreme case in which countries are either interested in their absolute payoff (bi = 0) or
in equity (ai = 0). The former are referred to as A-countries, the latter as B-countries.
In total, there are Na A-countries and Nb B-countries; ka of these A-countries and
kb B-countries form the coalition. The abatement levels are denoted by qas, qbs for
signatory countries, qan and qbn for countries outside the coalition.
Let us first look at the behaviour of B-countries. Outside the coalition, any B-country
can arrive at the equal share by choosing the average abatement cost level. Thus,
C(qbn) =
1
Na + kb
[kaC(qas) + kbC(qbs) + (Na − ka)C(qan)] .
Therefore, for a B-country inside a coalition to have no incentive to leave, it also must
receive the equal share:
C(qbs) =
1
N − kb [kaC(qas) + (Nb − kb)C(qbn) + (Na − ka)C(qan)] . (10)
Thus, in any equilibrium, all B-countries choose the same abatemenent level, qb :=
qbn = qbs, and receive the equal share:
C(qb) =
1
Na
[kaC(qas) + (Na − ka)C(qan)] .
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ka 1 2 3 4 5 6
πan
πas
Q
0.113
0.113
0.012
0.1322*
0.118*
0.014*
0.170
0.1318
0.018
0.227
0.155
0.023
0.301
0.188
0.031
0.390
0.229
0.040
ka 7 8 9 10 11 12
πan
πas
Q
0.495
0.279
0.051
0.612
0.336
0.063
0.741
0.400
0.077
0.879
0.471
0.092
1.024
0.548
0.109
-
0.629
0.126
Table 1: Payoffs to non-cooperating (cooperating) countries, πan (πas), and aggregate
abatement, Q, as a function of ka (Na = 12, Nb = 0). The unique equilibrium is
marked with *.
A-countries outside the coalition again maximise their absolute payoff, B(Q)−C(qan).
The first order condition is given by
B0(Q) = C 0(qan), (11)
whereas the coalition maximises the utility of a representative A-type-member by guar-
anteeing its B-members the equal share, i.e. equation (10). The first order condition
for choosing qas is therefore given by:
0 = B0(Q)
·
ka + kb
∂qbs
∂qas
¸
− C 0(qas) (12)
= B0(Q)ka
·
1 +
kb
N − kb
C 0(qas)
C 0(qbs)
¸
− C 0(qas). (13)
By construction, for any given ka and kb, every B-country is indifferent to being either
inside or outside the coalition. For a coalition to be stable, an A-country must not have
an incentive to join or leave the coalition. In general, for any kb there will be a certain
number of A-countries, ka, that will join the coalition. We have multiple equilibria.
The properties of the equilibria are best understood by considering an example. Con-
sider the following quadratic payoff functions: B(Q) = 10(Q − Q2/2) and C(q) =
5000q2.
Table 1 presents the simulation results for a total of 12 countries when all are of type
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ka →
kb ↓
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
πan
πas
Q
0.113
-
0.012
0.113
0.113
0.012
0.156
0.142
0.016
0.240
0.202
0.025
0.354
0.284
0.037
0.490
0.382
0.051
-
0.492*
0.067*
1
πan
πas
Q
0.113
-
0.012
0.115
0.114
0.012
0.168
0.148
0.017
0.264
0.215
0.027
0.388
0.302
0.040
0.534*
0.404*
0.055*
-
0.518
0.073
2
πan
πas
Q
0.113
-
0.012
0.118
0.115
0.012
0.185
0.157
0.019
0.293
0.230
0.030
0.430*
0.321*
0.044*
0.587
0.427
0.061
-
0.544
0.080
3
πan
πas
Q
0.113
-
0.012
0.122
0.117
0.013
0.206
0.166
0.021
0.330
0.245
0.034
0.480*
0.341*
0.050*
0.650
0.451
0.068
-
0.571
0.088
4
πan
πas
Q
0.113
-
0.012
0.130
0.120
0.014
0.233
0.176
0.024
0.375*
0.260*
0.039*
0.540
0.361
0.056
0.726
0.475
0.076
-
0.597
0.097
5
πan
πas
Q
0.113
-
0.012
0.142
0.122
0.015
0.269
0.184
0.028
0.432*
0.273*
0.045*
0.618
0.378
0.064
0.821
0.494
0.086
-
0.619
0.110
6
πan
πas
Q
0.113
-
0.012
0.161
0.124
0.017
0.318*
0.188*
0.033*
0.507
0.279
0.053
0.718
0.385
0.075
0.943
0.503
0.100
-
0.629
0.126
Table 2: Payoffs to non-cooperating (cooperating) countries, πan (πas), and aggregate
abatement, Q, as a function of ka and kb (Na = 6, Nb = 6). The equilibria are marked
with *.
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A, i.e. interested solely in their absolute payoff (Na = 12). Here, in equilibrium, two
countries cooperate. If, however, half of the 12 countries are interested in receiving
the equal share (Na = Nb = 6), the coalition size in equilibrium becomes larger. Table
2 presents both the total abatement level and the payoffs to cooperating and non-
cooperating A-countries as a function of the number of A- and B-countries inside the
coalition. Here, if no B-country enters the coalition, all A-countries cooperate. If all
B-countries are within the coalition, then only two A-countries enter. In general, when
B-countries join the coalition, they successively drive out A-countries. This can be
illustrated by the equilibria in Table 2: The first, second, fourth, and sixth entering
B-country reduces the number of A-countries in the coalition and thereby lowers the
payoffs to both, signatory and non-signatory countries. The payoffs to all countries
increase, however, when a third or a fifth B-country enters the coalition and the number
of cooperating A-countries stays at 4 and 3, respectively. In all equilibria, however, the
payoffs and the aggregate abatement level are larger than in the case where Na = 12,
i.e. when all countries are solely interested in their absolute payoff. Therefore, in this
example, the presence of equity-interested countries leads to efficiency gains which are
largest if all B-countries stay outside the coalition.
The results of the simulations — which appear to be robust to variations of the payoff
functions and the total number of countries — can be summarised as follows:
Result 5 The larger the total number of equity-oriented countries (Nb) is, the higher
the incentives are for A-countries to join the coalition. In other words, for a given kb,
the number of cooperating A-countries ka increases in Nb.
Result 6 The more B-countries join the coalition, the smaller the incentives are for
A-countries to do so. In other words, in equilibrium, kb and ka are negatively correlated.
Result 7 The total abatement level increases with the number of B-types outside the
coalition. A joining B-country improves the payoffs only if it does not drive out an
A-country.
The rationale of results 5 and 6 is the following: If an A-country enters the coalition and
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the coalition increases its abatement efforts, B-countries outside the coalition increase
their abatement activities as well and thereby additionally reward the entering country.
If the number of such equity-oriented B-countries outside the coalition gets larger, this
external reward for joining a coalition increases and, therefore, the equilibrium coalition
size increases. Analogously, if B-countries join the coalition, less countries outside the
coalition reward the entering A-country by an increase of their abatement activities.
Hence, the incentives for A-countries to enter the coalition decrease and the number of
A-countries that are inside the coalition in equilibrium gets smaller. Result 7 reflects
the fact that, in general, the more countries cooperate, the higher the efficiency gains
are and the closer the aggregate abatement level is to the efficient one. The impact of
A- and B-countries on the decision of the coalition, however, differs in the following
way: A joining A-country is interested in the absolute payoff and, consequently, the
re-optimising coalition increases its abatement effort because the positive effect on one
more country is now taken into account. A joining B-country, however, is not primarily
interested in the absolute payoff, but in the equal share. Therefore, the coalition will
not increase the total abatement level that much because the B-country refrains from
deviating from the abatement level of non-cooperating countries. Consequently, the
efficiency gains are larger if an A-country enters the coalition than if a B-country joins.
Therefore, B-countries are welcome inside a coalition only if their entering does not
drive out an A-country.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied two different games that model basic features of international
cooperation to provide a public good such as environmental quality. Instead of countries
that are solely interested in their absolute payoff, we studied equilibria based on ERC-
preferences. This theory explains the behaviour of people observed in experiments by
assuming that a part of utility depends (non-monotonously) on the received relative
payoff share.
We demonstrated that for a discrete prisoner’s dilemma, cooperation can result. If
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it does, then the fraction of cooperating countries is rather large (above 50 per cent).
This result, however, cannot be confirmed for the one-shot emission game, which better
describes the action set with respect to environmental problems like global change.
Here, in fact, ERC does not change the equilibrium at all. Countries (in equilibrium)
still behave as if they were exclusively maximising their own payoff.
We then studied the process of international environmental negotiations in the stan-
dard two stage coalition formation game. If countries’ preferences can properly be
described by ERC, the coalition game can generate cooperative behaviour. The result
of the traditional literature on coalition formation that the coalition size is rather small
therefore differs substantially: Even the grand coalition can be stable if all countries
put enough weight on getting close to the equal payoff share. In general, the pres-
ence of countries that are highly motivated through obtaining the equal share leads
to efficiency gains. In particular, for countries that are interested exclusively in their
absolute payoff, the incentive to join a coalition increases with the number of equity-
oriented countries that stay outside the coalition, but it becomes smaller when those
countries enter the coalition. Thus, by entering a coalition, equity-oriented countries
may drive out countries that are motivated by their own absolute payoff and thereby
worsen the payoffs for all countries. Aggregate abatement and, therefore, efficiency
gains are maximal if the countries that are interested in getting their equal share stay
outside the coalition.
In conclusion, observing international environmental agreements that are signed by a
large number of countries may indicate that (at least some) countries are not solely
interested in their absolute payoff, and their behaviour could be explained by the ERC-
theory.
Note, however, that, in this paper, we exclusively analysed the case of countries which
are symmetric with respect to their payoffs. In general, countries clearly are heteroge-
nous (as, for example, the U.S. and the European Union, and some developing countries
are with respect to their benefit and costs of abatement of CO2), and a preference for
equity would probably not regard an equal payoff structure. Instead, equity might
be preferred with respect to the abatement targets as percentages of the business-as-
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usual-emissions or in terms of CO2 emissions per capita. The implications of such a
preference for equity in the case of heterogenous countries remain subject to further
research.
6 Appendix
Proof of proposition 2:
We have to show that δ(k) < 0 for k ≤ N/2− 2. Using (4 ), this is equivalent to·
B(k + 1)
B(k)
− (k + 1)C(k + 1)
kC(k)
¸
+ (k + 1)C(k + 1)
·
1
kC(k)
− 1
NB(k)
¸ ·
2− N
k + 1
¸
< 0.
From the monotonicity and concavity of B(·) it follows that B(k+1)/(k+1) < B(k)/k.
Further, total cost of cooperation kC(k) increase in k. Therefore,
B(k + 1)
B(k)
− (k + 1)C(k + 1)
kC(k)
≤ k + 1
k
− 1 = 1
k
.
Since we assumed payoffs to be non-negative, B(k) ≥ C(k). Thus,
(k + 1)C(k + 1)
·
1
kC(k)
− 1
NB(k)
¸
≥ (k + 1)C(k + 1)
kC(k)
N − k
N
≥ N − k
N
.
For k < N/2− 1 we therefore obtain·
B(k + 1)
B(k)
− (k + 1)C(k + 1)
kC(k)
¸
+ (k + 1)C(k + 1)
·
1
kC(k)
− 1
NB(k)
¸ ·
2− N
k + 1
¸
≤ 1
k
+
N − k
N
·
2− N
k + 1
¸
=
N(k + 1) + 2(N − k)k(k + 1)− (N − k)Nk
Nk(k + 1)
.
The numerator equals −2k3+(3N − 2)k2−N(N − 3)k+N which can easily be shown
to be negative for 1 ≤ k ≤ N/2 − 2 as long as N ≥ 8. Hence, for N ≥ 8 we have
δ(k − 2) < 0 for k ≤ N/2.
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